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Abstract
This paper examines how quality incentives are related to the interoperability of competing plat-
forms. Platforms choose whether to operate standardised or exclusively, prior to quality and
subsequent price competition. We find that platforms choose a common standard if they can
coordinate their quality provision. The actual investment then depends on the cost of quality
provision: If rather high, platforms refrain from investment; if rather low, platforms maintain
vertically differentiated platforms. The latter case is socially more desirable than exclusivity
where platforms do not invest. Nevertheless, quality competition of standardised platforms in-
duces the highest investment and maximum welfare.
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1 Introduction
How are quality investments related to the interoperability of competing platforms ? By
choosing whether to operate on a common standard, platforms decide on quality spillovers
and to what extent network effects arise. This in turn influences competition and the prof-
itability of investments. Platforms’ decision about a common standard and investment
incentives are therefore interdependent.
As an example for platform competition, consider the telecommunications industry. Here,
some network providers claim that only exclusive rights will lead to quality investment. In
fact, there is an ongoing debate, started by Schumpeter (1943) and Arrow (1962), whether
standardisation or exclusivity, thus, spillovers or appropriability, stimulate innovation in-
centives. On a related note, the new regulatory framework 2002 of the EU (Directive
2002/19/EC) recommends but does not prescribe the use of standards to achieve inter-
operability.1
In our paper, we specifically relate to international phone calls over VoIP as an example
for platform competition and, thus, a two-sided market: In a two-sided market, platforms
serve as intermediaries between two distinct groups of users each of which values the num-
ber of users of the other group. Accordingly, VoIP providers serve to connect callers from
one to another country where callers value the provider in proportion to their connectivity.
Referring to this particular example, we study the effect of firms’ interoperability choices
on competition and subsequent quality investments. With respect to quality incentives,
we consider the important role of standard-setting organisations and joint research in the
telecommunications industry. Therefore, we incorporate the possibility of coordinated
quality provision into our analysis.
By our analysis we link previous research on compatibility with the one on individual
and joint research effort and apply it to competition in a two-sided market. Consider-
able discussion on compatibility has started with Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz
and Shapiro (1985). These articles look at the coordination problem associated with an
endogenous choice of compatibility and investigate the social optimal degree of it. We, in
contrast, are mainly concerned with platforms’ mutual agreement on a common standard,
1 Common standards are published in the Directive 2002/19/EC on Access and Interconnection
(related to network interconnection, this mainly refers to application interfaces and transmission
protocols). Interoperability is also encouraged to achieve universal service.
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i.e. two-way compatibility. Therefore, we simplify our analysis by considering the two po-
lar cases of full two-way compatibility versus incompatibility only, namely, standardisation
and exclusivity. This approach is similar to Economides (1986). But while Economides
(1986) explores how standardisation affects competition in relation to product variety, we
adhere to network externalities to investigate how firms’ standardisation choice is linked
to quality incentives. In this regard, we extend Armstrong (2006)’s and Armstrong and
Wright (2006)’s example of platform competition. Like Doganoglu and Wright (2006),
we consider two competing platforms which have to agree whether to standardise or not
before they actually compete. But they study how multihoming agents, i.e. agents who
subscribe to multiple platforms, affect platforms’ choice to standardise. We, instead, ex-
amine quality incentives by adding a quality stage comparing individual with collusive
efforts. In doing so, we follow D’Aspremont and Jaquemin (1988). Katz (1986), in this
context, more thoroughly explores different types of cooperative R&D efforts where we
distinguish between individual and joint research activity only. Note that our equilibrium
results rely on the concept of “fulfilled expectations” with regard to platforms’ market
shares. This concept has been adopted by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and others before.
Our main insight relates to platforms’ strategic incentive to choose a common standard
in order to collude in qualities: Allowing platforms to coordinate their quality provision
makes them choose a common standard. They do so because collusion prevents platforms
to enter a quality race without any gains and because competition is more intense in case
of exclusivity. When standardised platforms collaborate, they ensure the efficiency of
their quality investment and abstain from unprofitably supplying the same high qualities.
Indeed, they jointly maintain a high- and a low-performance platform in case quality
provision is not too costly. Collusion in case of standardisation is, in effect, socially
more desirable than exclusivity where platforms refrain from investment. Still, highest
investments and maximum welfare are induced by quality competition of standardised
platforms.
These results depend on the distinct character of platform competition and network
effects. By their standardisation decision and by the possibility of collusive qualities
platforms manipulate these market features. In fact, platforms choose a common stan-
dard to mitigate competition. The reason is that by standardisation, platforms allow
their subscribers to connect to all opposite subscribers regardless of their platform choice.
Therefore, platform specific feedback effects between user groups, that intensify com-
petition, disappear. On a related note, collusion prevents platforms to enter a quality
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race which induces them to invest without any gains. Instead, they either jointly omit
providing higher qualities or invest to establish asymmetric platforms. In the latter case,
platforms gain from higher quality provision due to increasing network effects. Thus, their
investment becomes profitable in and due to the presence of spillovers. These findings
should, in principal, continue to hold if we considered additional connectivity within the
same market side. This is so, as long as exclusivity in contrast to standardisation gen-
erates the above mentioned platform effects and as long as network effects exert positive
externalities on subscribers’ benefits.
That feedback effects between user groups intensify competition has already been ob-
served by Armstrong (2006). Further, our results comply with Doganoglu and Wright
(2006) in finding that standardisation serves to undermine this tendency. In addition to
these insights, we relate the issue of platform competition and compatibility to quality in-
centives: Here, we obtain results opposite to D’Aspremont and Jaquemin (1988). In their
model, investments decrease with larger spillovers whereas in our model, quality incentives
arise with standardisation and therefore with large spillovers. In this context, coopera-
tive quality investments further turn out to be socially more beneficial than exclusivity
but they do not produce higher quality incentives and highest welfare as in D’Aspremont
and Jaquemin (1988). The differences occur because we look at platform competition:
Spillovers, strictly speaking, a common standard, here prevent feedback effects between
user sides which - in case of exclusivity - give rise to more rigorous competition. Moreover,
coordination, in our model, is crucial to firms as it enables them to vertically differentiate
and exploit increasing network effects given a fixed market size. Such behaviour is omit-
ted by assumption in D’Aspremont and Jaquemin (1988). Here, collusion gives higher
incentives to invest with larger spillovers if it expands the market and significantly shifts
demand upward.
To study the problem we proceed as follows: Section 2 contains the basic setup, Section 3
looks at competition for subscribers in case of standardised and exclusive platforms, Sec-
tion 4 deals with the choice of quality investments, Section 5 looks at the compatibility
decision and Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We study a market which involves two groups of agents. These agents interact via “plat-
forms” where one group’s benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other
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group it can connect to. Such a market is commonly referred to as “two-sided”. To anal-
yse competition in such a market, let us consider two platforms a = A,B which serve as
intermediaries between the two different types of agents i = 1, 2.
Agents:
On each platform side, there is a continuum of heterogeneous agents i with a total mass of
1 . These agents are uniformly distributed over a Hotelling line with location xi ∈ [0, 1],
where platform A is situated at 0 and B at 1. The agents join one of the platforms for
a fixed subscription fee pai which enables the two different groups to interact. Therefore,
total utility amounts to the benefit uai of an agent i belonging to platform a reduced by
the subscription fee and ’transport cost’ txi, i.e.
Uai = u
a
i − pai − txi (1)
with t reflecting how much consumers’ taste varies ex ante. A possible interpretation of
cost induced by varying consumer taste include costs of learning about the new service
and signing up for it. Benefits uai , derived from possible transactions with the other type
of agents, are contingent on whether platforms’ agreed to use a common standard or not
and on transaction qualities qa. We restrict attention to positive network effects and
neglect exclusionary strategies, therefore, we assume qa ∈ [q, q] where 0 < q < q < 3
4
t. If,
then, platforms decide to operate exclusively, benefits are equal to
ua,Ei
(
qa, Naj
)
= v0 + 2q
aNaj . (2)
By this, benefits are increasing in platform a’s expected number of opposite users Naj and
the quality qa the platform provides. We add positive baseline utility v0 to ensure full
participation of potential subscribers, assuming that it is sufficiently large.
For the case of standardised platforms, we specify net benefits of an agent i at platform
a by
ua,Si
(
qA, qB, Naj
)
= v0 + 2q
aNaj + (q
A + qB)(1−Naj ). (3)
Thus, the main difference to the case of exclusivity is that user i of platform a can con-
nect to both platforms’ opposite subscribers, respectively platform a’s expected number
Naj and the rival’s expected number N
b
j = 1 − Naj . Referring to the stochastic nature of
Internet traffic over multiple networks, we assume that transaction quality corresponds
to the average quality of platforms involved. That is, transactions are characterised by a
platform’s own quality in case users connect on the same, and the sum of both platforms’
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qualities in case users connect over the two platforms.
Platforms:
Competing for subscribers involves several decisions of the two platforms: In a first step,
they have to agree whether to operate on a common standard or not: Choosing a com-
mon standard ensures the interoperability of platforms. After that, they decide on their
quality qa. But before fixing their actual level of quality investment, the two platforms
can consider coordination. Providing quality incurs cost C(qa) = γ
(
qa − q)2. Under this
assumption, quality cost C(qa) is continuous, strictly increasing and convex in qa and
amounts to zero if only the minimum quality q is supplied. We presume any other cost
to be a fixed setup cost and normalise it to zero.2 Finally, in the market stage, platforms
simultaneously set the subscription fees pai for their user groups i. Note that we abstract
from capacity concerns, as this is not the main concern of our analysis.
Given these decisions and the cost of quality provision, a platform a’s profit function can
be written as
Πa = pa
1
na
1
+ pa
2
na
2
− C(qa). (4)
In addition, we maintain the following assumptions throughout our analysis:
Assumption 1. t < 2
3
v0.
This ensures all agents subscribe to one platform in equilibrium. Further, we suppose
Assumption 2. t2 > (qA + qB)2
and
Assumption 3. t ≥ 1.
Under these assumptions, platforms’ profits are always strictly concave in prices.
Therefore, the equilibrium in the market stage is unique. Finally, we restrict attention to
Assumption 4. 0 < γ < 16/9t ≡ γ.
Then, both platforms find market activity profitable in equilibrium and their partici-
pation is ensured.
2 This seems adequate since we refer to interconnection via the Internet. Here, it is said that
interfaces and other interconnection facilities involve initial setup costs, but no other traffic-
dependent cost in the absence of capacity constraints, see also Atkinson and Barnekov (2004).
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Figure 1: The Timing of the Game
The time structure of the model is summarised in Figure 1: Firstly, platforms choose
whether to conform to a common standard or not. Then, platforms decide whether to
cooperate in terms of quality investments. Subsequently, simultaneous quality invest-
ments take place. Finally, platforms determine subscription fees and agents choose which
platform to subscribe to given their expectations about the number of subscribers on the
opposite side will be fulfilled, formally nai = N
a
i .
3
We will determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game by solving it back-
wards.
3 Market shares and prices
Market shares are determined by the indifference condition UAi = U
B
i . This identifies the
marginal consumers xi, indifferent between joining network A or B, for each market side
i = 1, 2. This yields
nai =
1
2
+
uai − ubi + pbi − pai
2t
(5)
given a fixed market size nAi +n
B
i = 1, so that n
B
i = 1−nAi . Note that we define platform
A’s market share nAi of agents i as xi ≡ nAi . Platforms consider (5) when they maximise
their profits, formally,
max
pa
1
,pa
2
πa = pa
1
na
1
+ pa
2
na
2
− C(qa).
We look at simultaneous price reactions of the two platforms to obtain equilibrium price
levels. Since we take platforms’ decision about a common standard as given, we distinguish
between the case of standardisation and exclusivity:
3 See Katz and Shapiro (1985).
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3.1 Standardisation
In case of a common standard, users subscribe to one of the platforms according to (3)
combined with (5). We presume fulfilled expectations about market shares with Nai = n
a
i
and resolve the ensuing conditions to describe platforms’ market shares as
nA,Si
(
t, qA, qB, pA,Si , p
B,S
i
)
=
1
2
+
qA − qB + pB,Si − pA,Si
2t
and (6)
nB,Si
(
t, qA, qB, pA,Si , p
B,S
i
)
=
1
2
+
qB − qA + pA,Si − pB,Si
2t
. (7)
By (6) and (7) the following is immediate:
Lemma 1. Given a common standard, each platform’s market shares are independent of
the opposite side’s prices. That is, competition for i-type users depends on prices pAi and
pBi only.
Observe that in case of a common standard, opposite subscribers can connect to each
other no matter which platform they joined: Hence, network effects across a platform
are undermined by interconnection and therefore, price competition in market 1 will
not influence competition in market 2 or vice versa. Platforms’ first-order conditions,
correspondingly, are
∂πa,S
∂pa,Si
= na,Si + p
a,S
i
∂na,Si
∂pa,Si
= 0 (8)
for i = 1, 2 and a = A,B and generate two sets of two simultaneous conditions. These
characterise equilibrium prices. Inserting these into (6) and (7) yields equilibrium market
shares. Proposition 1 summarises the results:
Proposition 1. In case of a common standard a unique equilibrium in the market stage
exists. For i = 1, 2, prices are given by
pA,Si = t+
1
3
∆q and p
B,S
i = t−
1
3
∆q (9)
and market shares by
nA,Si =
1
2
+
1
6t
∆q and n
B,S
i =
1
2
− 1
6t
∆q. (10)
Here, qualities are expressed by their relative value, i.e. ∆q = q
A − qB. Market
shares and prices of a platform A are increasing in ∆q, those of platform B in −∆q.
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Indeed, platforms only gain from higher qualities by outperforming their rival. This is a
well-known feature of price competition in regular one-sided markets. Interestingly, even
though we analyse competition in a two-sided market, the number of a platform’s opposite
subscribers does not affect the outcome. The reason is that - in case of standardisation - a
platform’s subscribers can always connect to all opposite subscribers. Then, as stated in
Lemma 1, subscribers’ network benefits arise regardless of its market shares on the other
platform side.
3.2 Exclusivity
In case of exclusivity, conditions (2) and (5) describe which platform users subscribe to.
Similar to the previous case, we presume fulfilled expectations and solve the conditions
for platforms’ market shares nA,Ei and n
B,E
i . We get
nA,Ei =
t2
T
(
1
2
+
∆q + p
B,E
i − pA,Ei
2t
)
+
1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qB + pB,Ej − pA,Ej ) (11)
and
nB,Ei =
t2
T
(
1
2
+
−∆q + pA,Ei − pB,Ei
2t
)
+
1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qA + pA,Ej − pB,Ej ) (12)
with T = t2 − (qA + qB)2 for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. By this, it immediately follows:
Lemma 2. Given exclusivity, each platform’s market shares are determined by subscrip-
tion prices of both platform sides. That is, a platform’s market share of i-type users
depends on all four prices pAi and p
B
i .
To see the intuition for Lemma 2, note that subscribers can only connect to opposite
members of their platform in case of exclusivity. Therefore, subscribers obtain higher
network benefits the larger their platform’s market share of opposite users. This leads to
interdependent competition for the two groups of subscribers. As a result, subscription
prices of both market sides affect the equilibrium outcome. This also becomes obvious by
looking at the platforms’ price reaction functions, a system of four simultaneous condi-
tions:
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nA,Ei + p
A,E
i
∂nA,Ei
∂pA,Ei
+ pA,Ej
∂nA,Ej
∂pA,Ei
= 0 and (13)
nB,Ei + p
B,E
i
∂nB,Ei
∂pB,Ei
+ pB,Ej
∂nB,Ej
∂pB,Ei
= 0 (14)
with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. By solving these and using (11) and (12), we find:
Proposition 2. Given exclusivity, a unique equilibrium exists in the market stage. Prices
are given by
pA,Ei = t−
2
3
(qA + 2qB) and pB,Ei = t−
2
3
(2qA + qB) (15)
and market shares by
nA,Ei =
t2
T
(
1
2
+
∆q
6t
)
− 1
3T
(
qA + qB
) (
qA + 2qB
)
, (16)
nB,Ei =
t2
T
(
1
2
− ∆q
6t
)
− 1
3T
(
qA + qB
) (
2qA + qB
)
(17)
with T = t2 − (qA + qB)2 and i = 1, 2.
Thus, quality differences ∆q and absolute quality levels q
a affect the market outcome
in case of exclusivity. Equilibrium prices, here, decrease when either platform provides
higher quality. For market shares, this is not clear at first sight because two opposite ef-
fects appear according to (16) and (17). The first one, represented by the first expression
on the RHS of (16) or (17), captures platforms’ direct competition for type i-subscribers.
Due to it, market shares increase when a platform provides higher quality than its ri-
val. On the contrary, the second term, displays a negative impact of higher platforms’
qualities on market shares. It arises because competition for both subscriber types is
interdependent as stated in Lemma 2. This generates feedback effects between platform
sides. It leads to intensified competition when there are higher qualities which induce
higher network benefits. Considering Assumptions 1 to 4 we compare the size of these
two effects and find that feedback quality effects dominate direct ones. Therefore, higher
qualities, in case of exclusivity, diminish market shares. Since feedback effects induce
fiercer competition, higher qualities likewise imply lower prices.
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From comparing Proposition 1 and 2 we immediately infer that price competition changes
when platforms decide to standardise or not:
Corollary 1. For given qualities, price competition in case of exclusivity is stronger than
in case of standardisation, therefore, pa,Ei < p
a,S
i for i = 1, 2.
Corollary 1 captures the key insight of our analysis: Platforms’ standardisation deci-
sion changes the way platforms compete with each other. Clearly, qualities have a different
effect on the market outcome. While quality changes affect a platform’s competitivity in
case of standardisation, they manipulate the strength of platform competition in case of
exclusivity. From a platform’s perspective, this immediately implies that standardisation
can serve as a means to soften competition.
4 Quality Investment
We now examine platforms’ incentives to invest in quality. As we follow D’Aspremont
and Jaquemin (1988)’s approach, platforms can choose to coordinate their quality levels
before they invest. Note that price and quality competition are linked to each other
because qualities are chosen before prices are set.4
4.1 Uncoordinated quality investment and standardisation
When platforms compete in qualities, they invest to maximise their profits, taking their
rival’s quality choice as given. Mutual best responses, then, determine equilibrium quali-
ties. Considering our results stated in Proposition 1, quality investment of a standardised
platform a amounts to
qa
∗
= argmax
qa
πa(t, γ, qa, qb
∗
) =
1
9t
(
3t+ qa − qb)2 − γ (qa)2 (18)
with a, b = A,B and a 6= b. Since a platform’s profit increases when it provides a higher
quality than its rival, a quality race occurs:
Lemma 3. There exists a γ∗ such that equilibrium qualities are given by qA,S
∗
= qB,S
∗
= q
if γ ≤ γ∗, and by qA,S∗ = qB,S∗ = 1/ (3γ) if γ > γ∗, when standardised platforms compete
in qualities.
4 See also Farrell and Saloner (1988). One could also analyse whether platforms would individually
make an effort to achieve compatibility ex-post. See Bender and Schmidt (2007) for an example
where such issue matters.
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Competition for subscribers, therefore, triggers quality investment subject to its cost.
If the cost of quality provision is relatively small, i.e. γ ≤ γ∗, where γ∗ ≡ 1/3q, max-
imum quality levels arise in equilibrium. If, however, cost is relatively high, platforms
invest until their marginal revenues equal their marginal costs. This solution represents a
classical prisoners’ dilemma where lack of coordination induces suboptimal outcomes for
platforms.5
4.2 Uncoordinated quality investment and exclusivity
In case of exclusivity competition for both types of subscribers is interdependent. A
platform a’s profit depends on both platforms’ qualities according to
πa,E =
2
T
[
t− 2
3
(qa + 2qb)
][
t2
2
+
t
(
qa − qb)
6
− 1
3
(
qa + qb
) (
2qb + qa
)]− γ(qa)2 (19)
which combines (4) with results from Proposition 2. Lemma 4 describes the equilibrium
quality choices.
Lemma 4. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium when exclusive platforms compete
in qualities. Platforms provide qA,E
∗
= qB,E
∗
= q.
Hence, when platforms operate exclusively, quality competition does not create invest-
ment incentives. Quite to the contrary, platforms withdraw from investment as much as
possible. This behaviour is induced by the way platforms compete for subscribers. Here,
according to Proposition 2, higher qualities will decrease a platform’s profit at any cost
level. The reason is that higher qualities intensify competition and lower prices. There-
fore, in order to receive higher profits, platforms refrain from investment. In other words,
lower investment serves to soften competition. 6
In sum, Lemma 3 and 4 allow us to compare platforms’ investment incentives, given
their decision about a common standard and uncoordinated investment. Proposition 3
summarises our findings:
Proposition 3. Without collusion, standardised platforms invest more in qualities than
exclusive ones, i.e. qa,S
∗
> qa,E
∗
for a = A,B.
5 Given symmetry, profit maximisation becomes a question of cost minimisation leading to mini-
mum quality levels.
6 In fact, if we permitted negative qualities such as conscious delay or interruption of transmission,
the equilibrium qualities would amount to qA,E = qB,E = − 1
6γ
. In other words, platforms would
aim to reduce dominant indirect network externalities to a certain extent.
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As noted before, platforms’ investment incentives build on the competitive situation
in the market stage. Since higher qualities might raise a platform’s profit in case of
standardisation, it invests. On the contrary, a platform does not invest in case of exclu-
sivity since higher qualities unambiguously reduce profits. Our results, therefore, contrast
D’Aspremont and Jaquemin (1988)’s. They claim that investment incentives are larger
the lower spillovers from investment. In our model this interplay between spillovers and
investment is reversed: Investment incentives are the highest the largest the spillovers,
which happens in case of a common standard.
4.3 Coordinated quality investment and standardisation
When platforms coordinate their investments, they choose quality levels to maximise joint
profits. Given a common standard, qualities are chosen according to
qa
∗
c = argmax
qa,qb
πSc (t, γ, q
a, qb) = πA,S + πB,S
considering each platform a’s individual profit as given in (18). Note that the joint profit
function πSc is not concave in qualities for all cost parameters γ so that the usual first-order
approach is inappropriate. Instead, following Bester and Petrakis (1993), we determine
the conditions under which a platform gains from providing higher quality by comparing
profits globally. Let us use
γAB ≡ 2
(
q − q) /9tq < 2/9t
to describe platforms’ quality investments as a result of collusion:
Lemma 5. Given a common standard, platforms collude to achieve maximal vertical
differentiation with qa,S
∗
c = q and q
b,S∗
c = q if γ < γAB. If, however, γ ≥ γAB, collusion
leads to minimum quality levels, i.e. qA,S
∗
c = q
B,S∗
c = q for a, b = A,B and a 6= b.
Here, for γ ≥ γAB, providing higher quality is always too costly to generate any
profits. Therefore, platforms mutually provide baseline quality q, when they coordinate
their investments. This incidentally resolves the platforms’ prisoners’ dilemma which
occurs for uncoordinated investments. Conversely, the outcome for γ < γAB is induced by
two different profitability concerns: First of all, taking the competitor’s quality as given,
marginal returns increase, when a platform provides higher quality. Second, providing
higher quality is less profitable the higher the competitor’s, since qualities interact as
strategic substitutes. In this situation, coordination allows platforms to consider both the
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individual and the strategic effect of supplying higher quality. As a result, they agree on
one platform of superior and one of inferior quality. This way, the majority of subscribers
locates at the platform which provides q and network effects are maximised. These can be
extracted via subscription prices, and therefore, platforms jointly achieve higher profits
than in case of quality competition.
4.4 Coordinated investment and exclusivity
Also in case of exclusivity, platforms consider joint profits πEc = π
A,E + πB,E when they
coordinate their quality investments. Yet, under exclusivity, investment incentives do not
alter with possible collusion:
Lemma 6. Exclusive platforms refrain from quality investment, s.t. qA,E
∗
c = q
B,E∗
c = q if
they coordinate their investment activities.
Clearly, this result arises because increasing qualities substantially intensify competi-
tion. To compensate for that, platforms maintain baseline qualities only. This serves to
lessen competition.
Proposition 4 summarises platforms’ investment incentives if they can coordinate quality
levels:
Proposition 4. When collusion is possible, platforms jointly provide higher qualities if
γ < γAB, i.e. q
A,S∗
c + q
B,S∗
c > q
A,E∗
c + q
B,E∗
c . If, however, γ ≥ γAB, platforms always
provide baseline quality q only.
Coordination, therefore, prevents unprofitable investments from a platform’s perspec-
tive. Nevertheless, coordinated supply of qualities does not necessarily result in mutual
low quality provision: With rather homogeneous consumers - if γ < γAB - exploiting
network effects implies highest joint profits. Thus, quality investment takes place and
asymmetric platforms arise.
5 Private and social incentives for interconnection
We now examine whether platforms prefer a common standard or exclusivity by comparing
profits of potential market outcomes.7 Indeed, incentive considerations of Lemma 5 and
7 It is clear that if platforms, in an alternative setup, agreed on interconnection after quality
but before price competition, standardisation would always arise. It is a consequence of softer
competition and the prospective of higher returns in such a situation.
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Corollary 1 imply that platforms always choose a common standard if they can collude
in qualities. To gain further insights, let us also look at the profits which result from
Figure 2: Profit outcomes, given q = 0.1 and t = 5
uncoordinated quality provision. First, suppose a situation of relatively low quality cost
where platforms vertically differentiate to maximise their profits:
Proposition 5. There exists a γI
(
q, q
)
with 0 < γI < γAB such that, with a = A,B,
platforms’ equilibrium profits under their different cooperative agreements can be ranked
as follows:
(i) If γ < γI , then π
S
c >
∑
a π
a,S > πEc =
∑
a π
a,E.
(ii) If γ ≥ γI , then πSc > πEc =
∑
a π
a,E >
∑
a π
a,S.
Thus, platforms agree on a common standard, as long as they can coordinate their quality
provision.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 5 for a numerical example by showing how profits of
market outcomes depend on cost parameter γ and maximum quality q, given baseline
quality q. The borderline between regions I and II is defined by γI
(
q, q
)
.8 Thus, in
region I, the gains from higher prices when platforms standardise - in spite of excessive
quality investment - are higher than the ones from saving quality cost when platforms
operate exclusively. Just the opposite applies in region II, where the lowest and highest
possible quality differ more significantly. Here, platforms prefer exclusive operation to
quality competition under a common standard.
Most importantly, platforms always prefer a common standard to exclusivity if they can
8 For an explicit expression of γI
(
q, q
)
and all other borderlines in the following, see the Appendix.
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coordinate their quality investment. This is so because collusion under a common stan-
dard enables platforms to reap profits from investment provided that it is not too costly:
By choosing a common standard, platforms sustain the profitability of quality investments
Figure 3: Profit outcomes, given q = 0.1 and t = 1.5
in case a platform outperforms its rival. Coordination, in such a situation, prevents
platforms to engage in quality competition. Instead, they abstain from investment if it is
too costly, or they invest to exploit increasing network effects if cost of quality provision
is rather low. Next, we study profit outcomes in case of relatively high quality cost where
platforms jointly agree to refrain from investment:
Proposition 6. There exists a γII
(
q, q
)
with γAB < γ
∗ < γII < 16/9t such that, with
a = A,B, platforms’ equilibrium profits under their different cooperative agreements can
be ranked as follows:
(i) If γ < γ∗, then πSc ≥
∑
a π
a,S > πEc =
∑
a π
a,E.
(ii) If γ∗ ≤ γ < γII , then πSc > πEc =
∑
a π
a,E >
∑
a π
a,S.
(iii) If γ ≥ γII , then πSc ≥
∑
a π
a,S > πEc =
∑
a π
a,E.
Thus, platforms choose a common standard as long as they can coordinate their quality
provision.
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Still, platforms choose a common standard if they can collude in qualities according to
Lemma 5 and Corollary 1. But in contrast to the previous case, platforms jointly refrain
from investment since providing higher quality is always unprofitable. Figure 3 illustrates
whether exclusivity or standardisation is preferred in case of quality competition. For
parameter values γ and q that lie in region I and III, standardisation where platforms
compete in qualities turns out to be more profitable than exclusivity. It is the result of
more intense competition in case of exclusivity. In region II, on the contrary, exclusivity
yields higher profits than quality competition of standardised platforms. Here, due to
significant quality differences, the cost of providing maximum quality offsets the gains
from softer competition compared to the case of exclusivity.
We further evaluate welfare for the various potential outcomes. This allows us to find
out whether private and social incentives for a common standard diverge. Note that for
our specific setup, welfare reduces to subscribers’ network benefits less transportation and
quality cost. Then, given that in our model market size is fixed, welfare indicates whether
quality provision generates additional surplus. We come to the following conclusion:
Proposition 7. Given the platforms’ different cooperative agreements, welfare can be
ranked as follows: W S ≥ W Sc > WE, i.e. quality competition of standardised platforms
always generates the highest and exclusivity the least social surplus.
Hence, the socially most desirable situation is aligned with the highest investment
incentives, which arise in case of quality competition between standardised platforms.
Note also that a common standard is both privately and socially desirable according to
Proposition 6 and 7. But in this regard, the effects of a common standard cannot be
disentangled from the possibility of collusive investments: From a social point of view,
quality competition between standardised platforms is optimal. Yet, platforms find a
common standard only desirable when they can coordinate their quality provision. Even
though coordination between standardised platforms does not lead to maximum welfare,
it creates higher social benefits than exclusivity due to additional network benefits.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we regarded competition in a two-sided market and examined how platform
interoperability affects platforms’ quality incentives. We found that platforms refrain from
quality investment in case of exclusivity, whereas they tend to invest in case of standardis-
ation. Furthermore, we have shown that standardisation prevails in equilibrium, provided
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that platforms can coordinate their quality provision. Indeed, platforms coordinate to
refrain from investment if cost of quality provision is rather high, and coordinate to cre-
ate vertically differentiated platforms if the cost is rather low. Therefore, cooperative
investment by standardised platforms might create higher aggregate surplus than exclu-
sivity. But still, highest investment and surplus arise with standardisation and quality
competition, as platforms enter a quality race then.
With regard to our example of VoIP communication services, we observe two standards
were developed and adopted, namely, Skype by the International Telecommunication
Union and H323.3 by the Internet Engineering Task Force. Whether our reasoning carries
over to their co-existence and their different levels of diffusion remains an open question.
Other arguments of competing standards pertain.
Since in our model quality incentives only arise with a common standard, our findings
oppose political claims of granting exclusivity to produce investment incentives. They
further indicate that costs and cooperative agreements play an important role when dis-
cussing investment incentives in a two-sided market. Indeed, they imply that it is un-
necessary to mandate standardisation as long as research joint ventures are permitted.
This suggests to encourage cooperative R&D efforts and, therefore, a permissive antitrust
treatment of joint R&D initiatives. Yet, imposing a standard and prohibiting collusion -
and therefore rigorous intervention - would achieve the welfare maximising outcome ac-
cording to our model.
Within our framework, we referred to interoperability considering the two polar cases
exclusivity and standardisation. Previous research has argued that, in the real world,
varying degrees of compatibility are realised, e.g. by technical means or by an adequate
pricing structure. Likewise, assuming agents’ full participation served to simplify our
framework and sufficed to make our point. Including such extensions might alter under-
lying network effects and might therefore give rise to different equilibrium constellations.
A full analysis of these issues is left to future research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Utilities of subscribers in case of interconnected platforms can be described as
UA,Si = v0 + 2q
ANA,Sj + (q
A + qB)(1−NA,Sj )− pA,Si − txi,
UB,Si = v0 + 2q
BNB,Sj + (q
A + qB)(1−NB,Sj )− pB,Si − t(1− xi)
withNB,Si = 1−NA,Si . Market shares are determined by identifying the marginal consumer
i with i = 1, 2 who is indifferent between network A and B, i.e. UA,Si = U
B,S
i . Presuming
xi = n
A
1
, this yields conditions as described in (5). Then, under fulfilled expectations, s.t.
nai = N
a
i , solving these conditions simultaneously leads to
nA,Si
(
qA, qB, pA,Si , p
B,S
i
)
=
1
2
+
qA − qB + pB,Si − pA,Si
2t
,
nB,Si
(
qA, qB, pA,Si , p
B,S
i
)
=
1
2
+
qB − qA + pA,Si − pB,Si
2t
also given in (6) and (7). These results have to be taken into account when platforms set
prices. The platforms’ profit considerations can be written as
max
p
a,S
1
,p
a,S
2
πa,S = pa,S
1
na,S
1
+ pa,S
2
na,S
2
− C(qa)
for a = A,B. Then, the first-order conditions with respect to prices pA,Si and p
B,S
i can be
stated as
1
2
+
qA − qB + pB,Si − 2pA,Si
2t
= 0 and
1
2
+
qB − qA + pA,Si − 2pB,Si
2t
= 0.
Solving simultaneously the two systems of two first-order-conditions results in equilibrium
prices
pA,Si = ti +
1
3
(
qA − qB) ,
pB,Si = ti +
1
3
(
qB − qA)
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as given in (9). Inserting these values into (6) and (7) returns market shares as given in
(10), i.e.
nA,Si =
1
2
+
1
6t
(
qA − qB) ,
nB,Si =
1
2
+
1
6t
(
qB − qA) .
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 2:
If platforms operate exclusively, agents’ utilities are given by (1) and (2). Market shares
are determined by the indifference condition UA,Ei = U
B,E
i . Analogue to the calculus for
Proposition 1, we presume xi = n
A
i and fulfilled expectations. Then market shares can
be expressed as
nA,Ei =
t2
T
[
1
2
+
qA − qB + pB,Ei − pA,Ei
2t
]
+
1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qB + pB,Ej − pA,Ej ) ,
nB,Ei =
t2
T
[
1
2
+
qB − qA + pA,Ei − pB,Ei
2t
]
+
1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qA + pA,Ej − pB,Ej )
with T = t2 − (qA + qB)2 and i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j according to (13) and (14). Profits
πA,E = pA,E
1
nA,E
1
+ pA,E
2
nA,E
2
− γ(qA)2 and (20)
πB,E = pB,E
1
nB,E
1
+ pB,E
2
nB,E
2
− γ(qB)2 (21)
are considered to derive platforms’ optimal price reactions with respect to prices pA,E
1
,
pB,E
1
, pA,E
2
and pB,E
2
according to (13) to (14). They can be explicitly stated as
t2
T
nA,S
1
+ 1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qB + pB,E
2
− pA,E
2
)
− t
2T
pA,E
1
− 1
2T
(qA + qB)pA,E
2
= 0,
t2
T
nB,S
1
+ 1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qA + pA,E
2
− pB,E
2
)
− t
2T
pB,E
1
− 1
2T
(qA + qB)pB,E
2
= 0,
t2
T
nA,S
2
+ 1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qB + pB,E
1
− pA,E
1
)
− t
2T
pA,E
2
− 1
2T
(qA + qB)pA,E
1
= 0,
t2
T
nB,S
2
+ 1
2T
(
qA + qB
) (−2qA + pA,E
1
− pB,E
1
)
− t
2T
pB,E
2
− 1
2T
(qA + qB)pB,E
1
= 0.
Here we require t2 > (qB + qA)2, i.e. T > 0. This ensures concavity of profits in its prices
and therefore unique equilibrium prices. Now, let us rewrite the system of equations in
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form of a matrix:
2t −t 2(qA + qB) −(qA + qB)
t −2t (qA + qB) −2(qA + qB)
2(qA + qB) −(qA + qB) 2t −t
(qA + qB) −2(qA + qB) t −2t


pA,E
1
pB,E
1
pA,E
2
pB,E
2

=

t2 + t(qA − qB)− 2qB(qA + qB)
−t2 + t(qA − qB) + 2qA(qA + qB)
t2 + t(qA − qB)− 2qB(qA + qB)
−t2 + t(qA − qB) + 2qA(qA + qB)

By solving it we obtain equilibrium prices
pA,Ei = t−
2
3
(qA + 2qB)
pB,Ei = t−
2
3
(2qA + qB)
as given in (15). From there, calculating price differences is straightforward and yields
pB,Ei − pA,Ei =
2
3
(qB − qA) and pA,Ei − pB,Ei =
2
3
(qA − qB).
By (11) and (12) this implies
nA,Ei =
t2
T
[
1
2
+
qA − qB
6t
]
− 1
3T
(
qA + qB
) (
2qB + qA
)
,
nB,Ei =
t2
T
[
1
2
+
qB − qA
6t
]
− 1
3T
(
qA + qB
) (
2qA + qB
)
as in (16) and (17).
q.e.d
Proof of Corollary 1:
Corollary 1 directly follows from (9) and (15).
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Proof of Lemma 3:
Given standardisation of platforms, a platform a’s profit function is
πa =
1
9t
(
3t+ qa − qb)2 − γ (qa)2 .
The first derivative with respect to quality qa can be expressed as
∂πa
∂qa
=
2
9t
(
3t+ qa − qb)− 2γqa. (22)
But before examining quality incentives in more detail, let us check whether a’s profits
are concave in qualities. To do so, we consider the Hessian
H(qA, qB) =
[
2
9t
− 2γ − 2
9t
− 2
9t
2
9t
− 2γ
]
The profit function is concave if H(qA, qB) is negative definite, i.e.(
2
9t
− 2γ
)2
−
(
2
9t
)2
> 0.
Thus, platform a’s profits are concave if γ > 2/9t.
Let us now look at (26) to examine quality incentives. There are incentives for higher qa
for any given qb if
2
9t
(
3t+ qa − qb)− 2γqa > 0.
With simultaneous quality decisions this yields condition
γ ≤ 1
3q
≡ γ∗.
Therefore, if γ ≤ 1
3q
quality investment of a platform a is
qa
∗
= q.
By considering 0 < qa < 3t/4, the least upper bound of γ∗ is given by sup(γ∗) = 4/9t >
2/9t. Therefore, we can derive both platforms’ quality choice by the usual first-order
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conditions if γ > γ∗. Considering (26), we, hence, simultaneously solve
2
9t
(
3t+ qA − qB)− 2γqA = 0 and
2
9t
(
3t+ qB − qA)− 2γqB = 0.
This yields
qA
∗
= qB
∗
=
1
3γ
.
We therefore summarise
qA
∗
= qB
∗
=
{
q if γ ≤ γ∗
1
3γ
if γ > γ∗
.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 4:
We use platform a’s profit in case of exclusivity as given in (19) to obtain the first deriva-
tive
∂πa
∂qa
=
4(qA + qB)
T 2
[
t− 2
3
(qa + 2qb)
][
t2
2
+
t
(
qa − qb)
6
− 1
3
(
qa + qb
) (
2qb + qa
)]
+
2
T
[
−2
3
(
t2
2
+
t
(
qa − qb)
6
− 1
3
(
qa + qb
) (
2qb + qa
))]
+
2
T
[
t− 2
3
(qa + 2qb)
] [
t
6
− 2
3
qa − qb
]
− 2γqa.
This expression can be simplified to
∂πa
∂qa
=
(3t− 2qa − 4qb)(2qa − t)
9(t− (qa + qb))2 − 2γq
a.
By considering Assumption 2 and imposing symmetry, thus, qA = qB, we find that
∂πa
∂qa
< 0.
Since this includes qA = qB = q, there are no investment incentives in equilibrium,
therefore,
qA,E
∗
= qB,E
∗
= q.
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q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 3:
The result directly follows from Lemma 3 and 4. By comparing equilibrium quality levels
qa,S
∗
and qa,E
∗
it immediately follows that qa,S
∗
> qa,E
∗
.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 5:
For standardised platforms, joint profits amount to
πSc =
1
9t
(
3t+ qA − qB)2 + 1
9t
(
3t+ qB − qA)2 − γ(qA)2 − γ(qB)2 (23)
= 2t+
2
9t
(
qA − qB)2 − γ(qA)2 − γ(qB)2. (24)
By considering its Hessian, we find that this profit function is not concave in its qualities
qA and qB for all cost parameters γ. Instead of using a first-order approach, we therefore
look at unilateral incentives to invest. Using (28), we can specify the condition under
which increasing quality qa raises joint profits. Define
I = πSc (·, qa +∆, qb)− πSc (·, qa, qb).
Then, increasing quality qa by ∆ is profitable if and only if I > 0. By inserting (28) and
rearranging, we get
γ <
2
9t
[
2(qa − qb) + ∆
2qa +∆
]
<
2
9t
. (25)
Further differentiating I with respect to qa and qb yields
∂I
∂qa
> 0 if γ <
2
9t
and
∂I
∂qb
< 0 ∀ γ.
Therefore, platforms invest up to the limit in qa, yet refrain from investing in qb to
maximise their profits subject to (29). Accordingly, joint profit maximisation leads to
qa = q ; qb = q if γ < γAB,
qa = qb = q if γ ≥ γAB
where γAB ≡ 29t
q−q
q
< 2
9t
.
q.e.d
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Proof of Lemma 6:
We consider joint profits πA,Ec = π
A,E + πB,E. The corresponding first-order condition
with respect to a quality increase qa is
∂πa,Ec
∂qa
= −2− 2γqa − (q
a − qb)(qa + 3qb − 2t)
T 2
.
By imposing symmetry with qA = qB = q, it simplifies to
−2(1 + γq) < 0.
This includes qA = qB = q. Therefore, qA,Ec = q
B,E
c = q.
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 4:
Results follow immediately from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Let us compare profits for the possible equilibrium constellations if γ < γAB. The sum of
profits when platforms standardise, but do not collude in qualities is∑
a
πa,S = 2t− 2γq2. (26)
If platforms standardise and choose qualities cooperatively
πSc = 2t− γq2 − γq2 +
2
9t
(
q − q)2 . (27)
In case of exclusivity, the possibility to collude does not affect aggregate profits, and
therefore, ∑
a
πa,E = 2t− 2γq2 − 4q = πEc . (28)
It is obvious from (30) and (31) that πSc >
∑
a π
a,S. Let us now classify the range of
profits if platforms operate exclusively. By (30) and (32) one has
∑
a π
a,S > πEc iff
2t− 2γq2 > 2t− 2γq2 − 4q.
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Rearranging yields ∑
a
πa,S > πEc if γ < γI
πEc ≥
∑
a
πa,S if γ ≥ γI
where γI ≡ 2q/
(
q2 − q2). Similarly, using (31) and (32) we have πSc > πEc iff
2
9t
(
q − q)2 > γ (q2 − q2)− 4q
which yields the condition
γ <
2
(
q − q)2 + 36tq
9t
(
q2 − q2) ≡ γ˜.
By a little rearranging γ˜ becomes
γ˜ =
2
(
q2 + q2
)
9t
(
q2 − q2) − 29t 2qq(q2 − q2) + 29t 18tq(q2 − q2) > 29t .
Since γAB < 2/(9t), we conclude π
S
c > π
E
c if γ < γAB. In sum, the order of profits if
γ < γAB is
πSc >
∑
a
πa,S > πEc =
∑
a
πa,E if γ < γI ,
πSc > π
E
c =
∑
a
πa,E >
∑
a
πa,S if γI ≤ γ < γAB
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 6:
As for (i), let us consider profits of standardised platforms which collude if γAB ≤ γ < γ∗.
It is
πSc = 2t− 2γq2. (29)
By comparing (33) to (30) and (32) we conclude
πSc >
∑
a
πa,S > πEc .
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As for (ii) and (iii) we consider profits of standardised platforms competing in qualities if
γ ≥ γ∗: ∑
a
πa,S = 2t− 2
9γ
. (30)
Considering (33) and q ≤ 1/3γ immediately implies πSc ≥
∑
a π
a,S. Further, by (32) and
(33) one has πSc > π
E
c as before. Then, by (32) and (34) we have
∑
a π
a,S > πEc iff
2t− 2
9γ
> 2t− 2γq2 − 4q
which we can rewrite as
2q
γ
(
γ2 +
2γ
q
− 1
9q2
)
> 0.
Define
F
(
γ, q, q
) ≡ γ2 + 2γ
q
− 1
9q2
and solve this quadratic equation to obtain
F
(
γ, q, q
)
< 0 if γ < γII ,
F
(
γ, q, q
) ≥ 0 if γ ≥ γII
where γII ≡
(√
10− 3) / (3q). It then directly follows that
πEc >
∑
a
πa,S if γ < γII ,
πEc ≤
∑
a
πa,S if γ ≥ γII .
Then, for all γ ≥ γAB, we obtain the following order of profits:
πSc ≥
∑
a
πa,S > πEc =
∑
a
πa,E if γ < γ∗,
πSc > π
E
c =
∑
a
πa,E >
∑
a
πa,S if γ∗ ≤ γ < γII
and πSc ≥
∑
a
πa,S > πEc =
∑
a
πa,E if γ ≥ γII .
Proposition 6 summarises these results.
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q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 7:
In general, given that platforms agree on a common standard, welfare is
W S = 2v0 + 4q
AnA
1
nA
2
+ 4qBnB
1
nB
2
+ 2
(
qA + qB
)
nA
1
nB
2
+ 2
(
qA + qB
)
nB
1
nA
2
− t
[(
nA
1
)2
+
(
nA
2
)2
+
(
nB
1
)2
+
(
nB
2
)2]− γ [(qA)2 + (qB)2] .
If platforms agree on exclusivity, it amounts to
WE =2v0 + 4q
AnA
1
nA
2
+ 4qBnB
1
nB
2
− t
[(
nA
1
)2
+
(
nA
2
)2
+
(
nB
1
)2
+
(
nB
2
)2]− γ [(qA)2 + (qB)2] .
1. Let us compare welfare for the possible equilibrium constellations if γ < γAB. If
γ < γAB, then aggregate surplus in case of standardisation and quality competition
amounts to
W S = 2v0 − t+ 4q − 2γq2, (31)
in case of standardisation and quality collusion it is
W Sc = 2v0 − t+ 2
(
q + q
)
+
5
9t
(
q − q)2 − γ (q2 + q2) and (32)
in case of exclusivity it is
WE = WEc = 2v0 − t+ 2q − 2γq2. (33)
In a first step, we look whether W Sc > W
E. Due to (36) and (37), this requires
2q +
5
9t
(
q − q)2 − γ (q2 − q2) > 0.
By considering γ < γAB < 1/(3q), we then obtain
2q +
5
9t
(
q − q)2 − γ (q2 − q2) > 2q − 1
3
(
q − q
2
q
)
+
5
9t
(
q − q)2 > 0
and conclude W Sc > W
E.
In a second step, let us check whether W S > W Sc . Considering (35) and (36) this
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requires
2
(
q − q)− 5
9t
(
q − q)2 − γ (q2 − q2) > 0.
Again, we look for a lower bound of the LHS to define and verify a stricter condition.
Considering γAB <
1
3q
and t >
(
q − q) due to Assumption 2, we obtain such a
condition. Since it is obvious that
2
(
q − q)− 5
9
(
q − q)− 1
3
(
q − q
q
)
> 0,
it follows that W S > W Sc if γ < γAB. By transitivity, it follows that
W S > W Sc > W
E if γ < γAB.
2. Let us now compare welfare for the possible equilibrium constellations if γAB ≤ γ <
γ∗. Here, W S and WE are given in (35) and (37), but
W Sc = 2v0 − t+ 4q − 2γq2 (34)
in case of standardisation and quality collusion. Comparing (37) and (40), W Sc >
WE is obvious. Further, W S > W Sc requires
4q − 2γq2 > 4q − 2γq2,
and therefore
γ <
2
q + q
.
This condition is fulfilled, simply note that
γ <
1
3q
<
2
q + q
<
2
q + q
.
Again it follows that
W S > W Sc > W
E if γAB ≤ γ ≤ γ∗
due to transitivity.
3. We now compare welfare for the possible equilibrium constellations if γ ≥ γ∗. Here,
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W Sc and W
E are given in (37) and (38), but
W S = 2v0 − t+ 4
3γ
− 2
9γ
(35)
in case of standardisation and quality competition. From (38) and (39) it is obvious
that W S ≥ W Sc because q ≤ 1/(3γ). Also W Sc > WE is obvious from (37) and (38).
Due to transitivity, we conclude
W S ≥ W Sc > WE if γ ≥ γ∗.
In sum, for the entire defined range of γ,
W S ≥ W Sc > WE.
q.e.d
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